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Technology is enabling new forms of  coercion and control over workers. 
While digital platforms for labour markets have been seen as benign or neutral 
technology, in reality they may enable new forms of  worker exploitation. Workers 
in precarious conditions who seek employment via digital platforms are highly 
vulnerable to coercion and control via forms of  algorithmic manipulation. This 
manipulation is enabled by information asymmetries, lack of  labour protection, 
and predatory business models. When put together, these deficits create a perfect 
storm for labour exploitation. This article describes how digital platforms alter 
traditional labour relations, summarises case data from several existing studies, 
and details emerging forms of  worker control and barriers to worker agency. It 
explores current definitions of  forced labour and whether digital spaces require 
us to consider a new conceptualisation of  what constitutes force, fraud, and 
coercion. It concludes with a summary of  possible responses to these new 
forms of  abuse in the global economy, including alternative models for business 
and for worker organising.
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Introduction
Workers living through what is variously called digital economy, surveillance 
capitalism,1 or the ‘fourth industrial revolution’ face new forms of  coercion 
and control. Jobseekers, particularly those who are already precarious and 
cannot rely on social capital, are looking online and turning to digital platforms. 
1 S Zuboff, The Age of  Surveillance Capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier 
of  power, Profile Books, New York, 2019.
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Platforms—web-based intermediaries which offer to link workers with jobs— 
are a key site for new forms of  rights abuse and exploitation. 
The promise of  technology for development has inspired several well-intended 
digital interventions targeting precarious workers, such as Kormo in Bangladesh2 
or Lynk in Kenya,3 which are designed to match informal sector clients with 
self-employed workers. However, the designers of  these interventions may not 
fully understand their human rights implications. Moreover, ‘future of  work’ 
discussions on the role of  technology in labour markets have largely centred 
on formal labour markets in developed economies, without understanding the 
extent to which digital intermediaries have been entering labour relations in 
developing countries and altering informal work. 
This article focuses on the ways in which surveillance capitalism, i.e. the expansive 
access to and trade in individual data as a basic raw resource driving global 
markets and economic life, expands the means for coercing and controlling 
labour. It draws upon evidence from two recent case studies on digital platforms 
for domestic work in India and South Africa and their effects on workers’ agency. 
It begins with a discussion of  how traditional labour relations are altered in the 
digital space. Citing recent research on algorithmic management and control, it 
offers a detailed discussion of  platform-mediated work and platforms’ roles as 
brokers, gatekeepers, supervisors, and as jobbers. It also looks at the implications 
of  the platform model for worker agency, particularly for migrants and highly 
isolated workers. It concludes with recommendations for programme design 
and policy interventions to mitigate risks, while calling for an expansion of  our 
understanding of  the elements of  forced labour in the digital economy.
Labour Relations in the Digital Economy
A small handful of  platform companies now dominate the entire globe, and 
are transforming our economic life.4 A ‘platform company’, per Gray and Suri, 
is a corporate entity whose business model relies on a two-sided application 
2 S Khalasi, ‘How Kormo and Bangalink are Helping the Urban Youth of  Bangladesh 
Connect to Jobs and Develop Their Careers’, Future Startup, 19 September 2019, 
retrieved 22 June 2020, https://futurestartup.com/2019/09/26/how-kormo-and-
banglalink-are-helping-the-urban-youth-of-bangladesh-connect-to-jobs-and-develop-
their-career.
3 No author, ‘Lynk, A Kenyan Startup Transforming the Informal Sector’, Proparco, 
n.d., https://www.proparco.fr/en/actualites/grand-angle/lynk-kenyan-start-
transforming-informal-sector.
4 K F Lee, AI Superpowers: China, Silicon Valley, and the new world order, Houghton Mifflin 
Harcourt, Boston, 2018.
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programming interface (API) and the internet to ‘source, schedule, manage, 
ship, and bill task-based, project-driven work’.5 Work is fragmented into digitally 
intermediated ‘gigs’ that in many ways resemble piece-work. 
Some have hailed the rise of  platform companies as an antidote to rising 
inequality and a harbinger of  a ‘sharing economy.’6 As Evgeny Morozov points 
out, platform companies present themselves in the United States and Europe 
as facilitating options for a struggling middle class. They claim to provide a 
platform for unemployed or underemployed people to monetise their existing 
assets and call themselves entrepreneurs.7 In countries with well-developed 
formal labour markets, the fiction of  being part of  an emerging ‘tech’ economy 
has helped these workers mask the stigma associated with entering the informal 
economy as cleaners, drivers, or factotums. In the rest of  the world, where 
such precarious employment has long been the norm, workers have no such 
illusions. 
Informal workers generally face well-documented vulnerabilities, such as lack of  
regular income or social protection. In addition, platform work may enable new 
forms of  control over workers through the extraction and commodification 
of  individual workers’ data. It is important to understand how not only labour 
but data are now being appropriated and commodified under what a growing 
number of  digital rights advocates are calling data colonialism.8 This has 
profound implications for workers’ agency and rights. As Couldry and Mejias 
describe, ‘whereas historical colonialism appropriated land, resources, and 
bodies, today’s new colonialism appropriates human life through extracting 
value from data.’ 
Data Labour’ and Lack of  Consent
Producing data is a form of  labour that has been broken into such minuscule 
pieces that anytime a reader ‘likes’ a social media post, or geo-tags an image 
as part of  a ‘captcha’ or challenge-response test, they have created something 
of  value in the digital economy.9 There is no meaningful consent between 
the provider and the corporate beneficiary of  what has been termed ‘data 
5 M L Gray and S Suri, Ghost Work: How to stop Silicon Valley from building a new global 
underclass, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Boston, 2019.
6 E Morozov, public lecture at Impakt Festival 2018, available at https://youtu.be/
nkReZuU5mxc.
7 Ibid.
8 N Couldry and U A Mejias, The Costs of  Connection: How data is colonizing human life and 
appropriating it for capitalism, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2019.
9 J Lanier, Who Owns the Future?, Simon & Schuster, New York, 2014.
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labour.’ This and other forms of  data extraction have major implications for 
the continued and potentially exacerbated commodification of  labour. One is 
that it is acceptable for companies to profit from unwittingly provided data 
labour, which they may use to train algorithms or sell to data aggregators who 
know how to monetise it further. The result is the commodification of  a much 
greater range of  human activity beyond consensual work. 
Worker rights advocates have yet to develop a response to the challenge of  
data extraction, where workers are compelled to provide data labour without 
their informed consent. Companies bank billions on the trade in personal user 
data,10 and harvest worker data as inputs for algorithms that determine how to 
further optimise their operations. For example, ride-hailing apps use driver and 
rider data to create increasingly sophisticated models and projections of  human 
mobility and to inform the development of  self-driving vehicles.11 On the 
surface we may see this as benign, and hope this research contributes to better 
mobility for more people. However, gig workers are generally compelled to sign 
exceedingly broad agreements for access to their personal data as a condition 
of  employment. Drivers have no meaningful way to opt out of  providing this 
data to the company, nor are they in any way compensated for this data labour.
Ride-hailing apps have also been exposed as having harvested other data (not 
covered under these agreements) from drivers’ phones without their knowledge 
or permission. For example, Uber was found to have surveilled its drivers’ 
phone calls to learn if  they were also driving for the competitor company Lyft.12 
This information was then used to manipulate drivers into dependency on Uber 
both through incentives (offering marginally better rates) and coercion (risk of  
being denied opportunities). In addition to using algorithms to push workers to 
accept sub-standard conditions and further externalise costs, there are reasons 
to be concerned about other ways in which worker data may be harvested, sold, 
and used by others. There is ample evidence of  how algorithms may be used to 
engage in behavioural manipulation, including manipulating people’s opinions, 
and luring people into extreme or illicit behaviour.13 




12 M Isaac, Super Pumped: The battle for Uber, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2019
13 Center for Humane Technology, ‘Your Undivided Attention Podcast, Episode 4: 
Down the Rabbit Hole by Design’, 10 July 2019, transcript available at https://assets.
website-files.com/5f0e1294f002b1bb26e1f304/5f0e1294f002b144fee1f411_CHT-
Undivided-Attention-Podcast-Ep.4-Down-the-Rabbit-Hole.pdf.
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In recent years, digital rights advocates have begun to push back on the lack of  
consent involved in data extraction and data labour, resulting in occasional policy 
reforms such as the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation. 
With this legislation, rights advocates in Europe have succeeded in calling 
attention to right to privacy issues or the ‘right to be forgotten.’14 However 
this approach fails to challenge the corporate right to commodify and benefit 
from individuals’ data labour. As data is fundamental to the platform business 
model, human rights advocates should consider the ethical implications of  the 
continuous extraction of  this resource from a population that serves both as 
consumers and labour.
Digital Labour Arbitrage
Another way in which platform companies disrupt labour relations is through 
digital labour arbitrage. Alarcon and Gray describe how platform companies 
tacitly structure and may even expand precarity in labour markets by mediating 
tasks that might previously have constituted formal jobs.15 Digital platforms 
subdivide work into ever smaller bits or ‘micro-tasks.’ For example, Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk platform outsources tasks that may take performers only a 
few seconds to perform, such as tagging images, and for payment that may be 
only a fraction of  the smallest denomination of  a country’s currency. Platforms 
are then able to engage in micro-negotiations over these bits, called ‘gigs,’ to 
further externalise costs surrounding each task onto workers. This alters labour 
relations by breaking down wage labour into ever smaller fragments and exerting 
new forms of  control over each fragment of  work. This has given rise to new 
use of  the term ‘gig worker’ to mean one who derives income from participation 
in digitally-mediated tasks and micro-tasks. 
Gray and Suri point out that this kind of  digital mediation builds on longstanding 
practices of  labour arbitrage, or the infamous ‘race to the bottom’, wherein 
jobs are shifted toward geographies with the lowest wages and weakest labour 
protection.16 What is qualitatively different is that technology accelerates the pace 
of  this competition to an inhuman level. For example, they describe workers 
on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk who must monitor their accounts constantly, as 
desirable ‘gigs’ may disappear minutes or even seconds after they are posted. 
Gig workers based in high-wage economies are in constant competition with 
14 B Wolford, ‘Everything You Need to Know About the Right to Be Forgotten’, FAQ 
on GDPR.EU available at https://gdpr.eu/right-to-be-forgotten.
15 A Alarcon and M L Gray, Future of  Work Global Labor: Literature review, USAID, 
Washington, D.C., September 2019, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00W54D.
pdf, p. 1.
16 Gray and Suri.
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workers from low-wage economies competing for the same tasks. Workers must 
also patch together a multitude of  ‘micro-tasks’ in order to reach an adequate 
level of  employment. The search costs to find each micro-task are externalised 
onto workers. Prices for tasks are fixed and non-negotiable. This is another way 
in which labour relations have been fundamentally altered. 
Algorithmic Cruelty
A third important alteration to labour relations is the disappearance of  the human 
relationship between employer and worker, as platforms impose algorithmic 
intermediaries between requesters and providers to establish compensation 
and terms and conditions of  work. Gray and Suri refer to this as ‘inadvertent 
algorithmic cruelty’, since it removes the possibility of  empathy between 
service provider and client. Algorithms are based on codes that necessarily rely 
on binary choices. These do not allow for consideration or understanding of  
human exigencies, such as the need to care for a sick family member or an 
unforeseen road blockage. Platforms may not have humans available to respond 
to workers who cannot meet the exact terms of  a gig for some reason, and may 
therefore impose harsh penalties on the worker for non-performance. Yet the 
choice to allow a code to determine a reward or penalty is ultimately intentional. 
The implications of  the removal of  a human interlocutor for worker agency are 
discussed with respect to the cases detailed below. As researchers noted in one 
of  the reports discussed: 
(Platforms are) reflecting and reproducing existing structures 
of  exploitation. Yet, it is also important to recognize the 
differences that arise from the digital and algorithmic 
intermediation of  domestic work. Domestic work involves not 
only physical work but also affective labor—it involves 
relationship building, trust, and negotiation... Much of  this is 
rendered impossible with work mediated through digital 
platforms.17
Worker Agency in Platform Labour
In most of  the world, economic activity in the informal sector dwarfs that in the 
formal sector. Nearly half  of  all workers in developing countries are self-employed 
17 Z Mawii and U Aneja, Gig Work on Digital Platforms. Case Study 3: SweepSouth – Platform-
Based Domestic Work, USAID, March 2020, https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/
PA00WHJ9.pdf, p. 15.
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and/or engaged in small-scale farming.18 Many more are underemployed and 
in insecure or precarious work, and the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) suggests that the trend in all countries is away from stable and long-term 
employment and toward non-standard work.19 In other words, many workers 
around the world are already ‘gig workers’, although they traditionally rely on 
social capital and word-of-mouth to obtain jobs. Furthermore, amid the recent 
economic shock caused by COVID-19 and the ILO prediction that up to 300 
million jobs may be lost,20 coupled with the dramatic rise in demand for contact- 
free services, it is now certain that the post-COVID recovery period will likely 
see an irreversible worldwide shift toward platform-enabled non-standard work. 
In recent years, development practitioners have been lured by the promise of  
technology as a fix for information asymmetries inherent in labour markets. 
As a consequence, they have heavily invested in platforms intended to enhance 
transparency of  information in labour markets. Platforms targeting low-wage 
jobseekers like Kormo (Bangladesh), Lynk (Kenya), and Bong Pheak (Cambodia) 
have proliferated; indeed, Bong Pheak was launched with a grant from the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) in order to provide better 
information to jobseekers who might otherwise be vulnerable to trafficking and 
exploitation.21 
To be sure, the problem of  imperfect labour markets is an important 
developmental challenge. There is a clear need for interventions to address 
the information asymmetries that make it easy to exploit workers. Since the 
early 1990s, my work as an anthropologist and development practitioner has 
examined the flow of  low-skilled young women from rural to urban areas in 
search of  jobs. These workers have entered factories, restaurants, domestic 
work, and, in some cases, sex work. In all scenarios they have suffered from 
information deficits: most have relied entirely on word-of-mouth assurances 
regarding the terms and conditions of  their work, and faced a very high risk of  
exploitation as a result of  their inability to know, let alone control, their ultimate 
work situations. Many have felt compelled to work through brokers and entered 
some form of  debt bondage to these middlemen. The brokers, by controlling 
information, have also controlled workers. 
18 World Bank, World Development Report 2013: Jobs, World Bank, Washington, D.C., 15 
October 2012. 
19 R Torres et al., World Employment Social Outlook: The changing nature of  jobs, ILO, Geneva, 
19 May 2015.
20 International Labour Organization, ILO Monitor: Covid-19 and the world of  work. Third 
edition, ILO, Geneva, 29 April 2020. 
21 P Ford, ‘Bong Pheak – Combating human trafficking through an employment 




Well-meaning advocates have sought to mitigate these issues by providing 
‘awareness-raising’ training regarding risks to prospective migrants. Their hope 
is that with better information migrants can make better choices regarding 
employment placements. This has included promoting online labour brokers 
such as Cambodia’s Bong Pheak. Unfortunately, the replacement of  informal 
networks of  labour brokers with online labour brokers may be an emblematic 
example of  how power asymmetries cannot be fixed by technology. 
By the early 2000s, the use of  information and communications technology for 
development was hailed as having great promise to crack complex challenges. 
Even rural communities seemed to be connecting online. Donors and advocates 
seeking to disrupt human trafficking networks were keen to use platforms 
to supplant informal and often unscrupulous middlemen for prospective 
rural-urban and cross-border migrants. USAID and other donors invested in 
platforms designed to provide more and better information to jobseekers.
Concerned with the possibility that outcomes for workers might not all be 
positive, USAID commissioned an evidence review and a series of  case studies 
in 2019 to examine the experience of  low-wage and vulnerable workers on 
platforms. It focused on the extent to which platforms corrected for labour 
market information asymmetries, how they affected basic labour protections 
and rights at work, and what consequences they had for worker agency. The 
case studies were carried out by the India-based firm Tandem Research. The 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI) simultaneously undertook a similar 
study.22 
The following section details findings regarding control and agency confirmed 
by two of  these case studies, on platforms targeting domestic work in South 
Africa (SweepSouth) and India (QuikrJobs, previously Babajob). These findings 
are supplemented by my own interviews under a fellowship with Open Society 
Foundations. I conducted life history interviews with approximately two 
dozen individuals working for ride-hailing and domestic service platforms 
in South Africa, the United States, United Kingdom, and India, and shorter 
interviews with driver representatives from Indonesia, Australia and Cambodia. 
I obtained additional material from the Brazil-based human rights organisation 
Reporter Brasil regarding their interviews with delivery, ride-hailing, and 
domestic service platform workers, and material from interviews with labour 
union representatives and labour policy experts in India, South Africa, and 
22 A Hunt et al., Women in the Gig Economy: Paid work, care and flexibility in Kenya and South 
Africa, Overseas Development Institute, London, November 2019, https://www.odi.
org/publications/11497-women-gig-economy-paid-work-care-and-flexibility-kenya-
and-south-africa.
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the United States. All interviewees cited in this article have provided consent 
to share their names and the content of  the interviews. 
Platforms as Brokers: Information asymmetry by design
Platforms act as gatekeepers between prospective employers and prospective 
workers. Thus, in principle, they are positioned to address information deficits 
among both employers and workers. This is the principle behind both the 
SweepSouth and QuikrJobs platforms. However, the cases suggest that the 
platforms may exacerbate rather than alleviate information asymmetries. 
The two platforms represent two different types of  intermediaries. SweepSouth 
is a gatekeeper. It functions as an active intermediary by assigning workers to 
specific jobs, determining remuneration, controlling other terms and conditions 
of  work, and retaining the right to disallow or ‘deactivate’ users from the 
platform. QuikrJobs’ operating model is different: it is a job aggregator. All 
interactions between jobseekers and employers, including negotiations over 
remuneration and other terms and conditions of  work, take place outside the 
platform.
In principle, both models increase workers’ access to information about 
prospective jobs and clients and decrease bias in labour markets through 
seemingly neutral placement criteria. Yet, it may be impossible to have truly 
neutral gatekeepers as algorithms may reinforce existing power dynamics. In 
South Africa, for example, where household employment relationships are 
rooted in apartheid-era race relations, both the Tandem interviews and my own 
suggested a high share of  recent migrants, particularly from Zimbabwe, are 
entering the domestic work sector. Migrants are more likely to favour use of  
online platforms than native South Africans since they do not have access to the 
other forms of  social capital that local workers use to obtain jobs. In addition, 
migrants generally face discrimination in the South African job market, which 
creates barriers to job placement through traditional channels. Even skilled 
migrants reported both to the Tandem team and to me that they were unable to 
access jobs at their skill and qualification levels and were subject to employment 
discrimination. Platforms allowed them to bypass these discriminatory barriers 
they faced in seeking employment. 
However, Tandem found that design features of  SweepSouth intentionally 
reinforced information asymmetries. While employers were provided with full 
biographical details and ratings of  the prospective workers, workers were not 
shown any details of  the clients they were matched with. Thus, employers were 
in a position to apply bias to their choices while workers had neither information 
nor choice. Further complicating matters, workers were also penalised for not 
accepting jobs. This type of  information asymmetry was also present in ride- 
hailing platforms. Drivers in my interviews confirmed that they could not make 
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informed choices about which rides to accept. The algorithms were designed to 
prompt drivers to accept rides without providing any information about fares 
or destinations.23 Only after the client was in the vehicle would the platform 
provide the driver with information about the destination. Even then, some 
drivers were not provided with information regarding the fare until after the 
ride was complete.
Because QuikrJobs is a job aggregator, it is in principle well-positioned to correct 
for information asymmetries. As the Tandem case study notes, jobseekers on 
the platform commonly lack data on what appropriate salaries or terms and 
conditions of  work are, and this limits their ability to bargain. This information 
asymmetry is ‘heightened by the fact that jobseekers may be looking for jobs 
in locations different from where they previously lived or worked and could 
possibly be applying to different job roles.’24 Job aggregator platforms could 
potentially improve workers’ agency by providing more fulsome information 
about and choice among prospective employers, wages, and terms and conditions 
of  work, and by reducing barriers to entry to labour markets. However, these 
features require active design choices. The study noted, 
QuikrJobs management did mention that they create a report 
on salary and hiring trends, demand for job roles, and market 
conditions. However, this is not released publicly. Having such 
data could help jobseekers negotiate better employment terms 
and conditions and avoid being exploited. It is worth noting 
that BabaJob used to have a feature that allowed jobseekers to 
see the average salary range for the particular job in that locality. 
This feature is not present on QuikrJobs.25
The study also found that jobseekers have no way of  reviewing employers or 
reporting fraudulent job postings. QuikrJobs reported that jobseekers can and 
do make complaints via the platform’s social media channels. However, this was 
insufficient to hold fraudulent posters or unfair employers accountable. Indeed, 
jobseekers’ comments suggested that the platform may be enabling fraudulent 
recruitment. The report states,
Some workers did note that they had come across fraudulent 
postings on the platform and some had even paid money when 
contacted by these fraudulent posters. QuikrJobs has processes 
in place to screen and remove fraudulent postings, but some 
 
23 Interviews, Cape Town and Johannesburg, July 2019; San Francisco, September 2019.
24 Mawii and Aneja, Case Study I: QuikrJobs – India, p. 10.
25 Ibid., p. 11.
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still remain... With most fraudulent postings, the aim is to 
convince workers to pay some money to the prospective 
recruiter.26
This again highlights the importance of  intent and design choices. In February 
2019, I interviewed the staff  managing the Bong Pheak platform. They 
indicated that they also lacked a sufficient guardrail to protect jobseekers against 
fraudulent postings—a particularly ironic design flaw given that Bong Pheak 
sought investment as an anti-trafficking intervention. 
These two models suggest that platforms must choose between allowing 
workers to negotiate freely while exposing them to risk of  fraud and deception 
(the QuikrJobs model), or providing more clarity around the terms of  work 
while offering less autonomy and choice to workers. Yet alternatives are 
possible. In 2014, the organisation Centro de los Derechos del Migrante (CDM) 
in Maryland launched a platform called Contratados. It is intentionally designed 
to provide employer information to prospective workers, verify the bona fides 
of  employers, and allow workers to post safe and anonymous reviews of  
employers. Aggregated data on patterns and practice are also used to inform 
advocacy on behalf  of  workers. There is some evidence that this approach has 
been successful in enhancing worker rights and worker agency.27 
Platforms as Supervisors: Rating systems as a means of  coercion and control
Rating systems are commonly used by platforms of  all kinds and represent 
another example of  how platforms can undermine workers’ agency. A 
simple one-to-five-star rating system is a common way for clients or users of  
a platform to rate anything from a product they have purchased online to a 
service such as an Uber ride or AirBnB stay. The system is ostensibly couched 
as ‘crowdsourcing’, enabling the product or service to continuously improve as 
a result of  customer feedback. In reality, it is often used as a control mechanism, 
instilling gig workers with fear of  ‘deactivation’ from the platform that may 
coerce them into accepting unsafe or exploitative conditions of  work. 
Deactivation is a term used to describe the suspension of  an account used 
by a worker to access gigs; it is effectively an electronic blacklist. Workers are 
penalised for receiving low ratings, and may be deactivated from the platform 
26 Ibid., p. 8.
27 L Rende Taylor and E Shih, ‘Worker Feedback Technologies and Combatting Modern 
Slavery in Global Supply Chains: Examining the effectiveness of  remediation-oriented 
and due-diligence-oriented technologies in identifying and addressing forced labour 




on the basis of  client complaints or low ratings. This invisible and impersonal 
form of  control is critical to consider in the context of  human trafficking as it 
may represent a form of  force or coercion where the agent of  coercion is an 
algorithm. This raises serious challenges regarding accountability.
This system of  rewards and punishments acts coercively to prevent workers 
from speaking out when laws are violated. A domestic worker interviewed in 
the Brazilian documentary A Uberização do Trabajo described how the platform 
Rappi would determine how many hours a gig would take based on the work 
described by the client. However, she would often find additional cleaning tasks 
at the assigned location, and fearful that she would receive a poor rating if  she 
did not complete them, would put in the extra time and work for no additional 
payment.28 Researchers who have documented app-based domestic work in the 
US and Europe share similar stories.29 Similarly, drivers I interviewed stated 
that they feared negative ratings from clients as it could trigger deactivation. 
Thus, they felt compelled to undertake assignments of  dubious legality, such as 
transporting minors. One driver in California explained how she rejected a ride 
when she realised she would be picking up two minors (illegal in California), 
reported the incident to the platform, only to witness the same individuals being 
picked up immediately afterward by another driver for the same platform. She 
was deactivated after filing the report.30
In this system, clients become unwitting instruments of  control. In the case of  
SweepSouth, workers reported that they are encouraged to maintain a rating 
of  4.75 (out of  a possible 5). Low ratings prompt warnings from the platform 
and three consecutive ratings of  below two stars results in worker accounts 
being deactivated. Workers have little to no ability to contest or negotiate these 
ratings.31 
The Tandem team found that clients may not understand the rating system, 
and their ratings may be based on a whim, or deeply ingrained racial and class 
stereotypes. They observe that:
28 C J Barros, C Angeli, and M Monteiro Filho (Dirs.), GIG – A Uberização do Trabalho 
[The Uberization of  Work], documentary film by Reporter Brasil, 2019, https://
reporterbrasil.org.br/gig.
29 A Mateescu and A Nguyen, Explainer: Algorithmic management in the workplace, Data & 
Society, 6 February 2019, https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/
DS_Algorithmic_Management_Explainer.pdf. 
30 Interview, September 2019.
31 Mawii and Aneja, Case Study 3, p. 10.
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The one-sided nature of  the ratings systems creates a structural 
domination of  the platform over workers which is dependent 
on worker fungibility. Although workers can also leave ratings 
for clients, the workers we spoke to did not seem to feel that 
this was of  much consequence […]. Workers do not have the 
option of  picking their clients or declining those with low 
ratings. Nor do they have the option to freely cancel 
appointments—SweepSouth deactivates their account if  they 
cancel more than four appointments in a month. Workers are 
also unlikely to cancel bookings because of  the loss of  earning 
potential. Autonomy is thus constrained both because of 
platform design and broader labor market conditions.32
This finding is common across studies of  labour market platforms. Consumer- 
sourced rating systems place additional pressures on workers to comply 
with clients’ demands, as poor ratings factor into algorithmic decisions on 
gig assignments. The fear of  deactivation acts to coerce workers to accept 
undesirable gigs and hours. It can leave workers with little choice but to forego 
workplace safety interests, such as declining to report sexual harassment out of  
fear of  receiving a poor rating from a client.33 
In their study on Uber drivers in India, Raval and Dourish found that drivers felt 
companies were using ratings in ways that clients themselves might not intend; 
nor did they perceive that clients understood the implications of  the rating 
system. They cite the following driver interview: 
As a driver mentioned, ‘Most passengers don’t understand Uber 
rating system. They are led to believe Yelp style rating. With 
Uber anything less than 5 stars is a failure.’ As has been widely 
reported from the data released by Uber, 4.6 is the lower limit 
below which drivers are given a warning and a stipulated time 
period to improve their ratings, failing which they get 
deactivated. … While Uber’s report mentions the top five 
complaints associated with low ratings, it does not comment 
on whether passengers are aware that within their rating system, 
unlike other known reputation systems, the rating threshold is 
much higher.34
32 Ibid.
33 Mateescu and Nguyen, p. 8.
34 N Raval and P Dorish, ‘Standing Out from the Crowd: Emotional labor, body labor, 
and temporal labor in ridesharing’, CSCW ‘16: Proceedings of  the 19th ACM Conference 




Gig workers I interviewed in South Africa were extremely concerned with 
deactivation, and virtually all of  the ride-hailing app drivers who participated 
in my interviews had been deactivated at least once.35 A deactivated worker can 
no longer access any jobs through the platform. The workers described the 
action as one in which their apps simply ceased to function, with no notification 
or warning. These platform workers typically only interface with the app and 
not with a person, so they have limited recourse to protest the deactivation. 
Interviewed drivers presumed that a low customer rating was the reason for the 
deactivation, but they were unable to obtain their files from the company to 
verify this. Some drivers were successful in calling the company and having their 
accounts reinstated, but felt that this, too, was arbitrary. One driver reported 
having her account mysteriously reactivated two weeks after the deactivation.36 
Platforms as Disruptors: Undermining labour protection 
In addition to the challenges described above, evidence of  new forms of  worker 
control has emerged around algorithmic management, the latest refinement of  
Taylor’s famous ‘time and motion’ approach. Algorithmic management uses 
artificial intelligence (AI) for data collection and continuous surveillance of  
workers to further extract or ‘optimise’ labour in what amounts to an extreme 
form of  labour arbitrage.37 This data enables platforms to control ever more 
fragmented bits of  a worker’s time, agency, and labour and use behavioural 
‘nudges’ to incentivise workers to work harder, faster, or provide labour at all 
hours. One example of  this is Upwork, a company that matches freelancers 
to gigs, which has ‘developed software—cheerfully called the “Private 
Workplace”—that provides minute-by-minute logs of  contractors’ computer 
keystrokes, tracks mouse movements, and secretly snaps periodic screenshots, 
so that the employers can ensure that their potential cyber slacker is on task.’38 
Algorithms acting as managers are not programmed to stop nudging for ever 
more efficient work. The algorithms are coded to continue optimising behaviour 
even when rates of  work and rates of  compensation are clearly in violation of  
local laws. If  a worker is willing to accept a task at below minimum wage, or 
even to take on debt to be selected for a task, most platform algorithms will 
reward rather than prevent this from taking place. One egregious example of  
this is the US-based household cleaning app Handy, which openly uses a system 
35 Interviews with Uber drivers in Cape Town and Johannesburg, July 2019.
36 Interview with Uber driver, Cape Town, July 2019.
37 Mateesceu and Nguyen.
38 S Hill, Raw Deal: How the ‘Uber economy’ and runaway capitalism are screwing American workers, 
St. Martin’s Press, London, 2015, p. 104.
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of  imposed fees on workers, leaving some in debt bondage.39 The examples 
shared by Reporter Brasil of  domestic workers on Rappi also emphasise this 
point. This is an intentional design choice. As Isaac and others have described, 
the business model of  many platform companies is to disrupt existing labour 
markets precisely by disrupting employment laws.40 The listing of  gigs at well 
below local and national minimum wage rates is a known feature of  many 
platforms. 
The companies are able to openly flout labour laws because they have successfully 
argued that they are not employers but simply job aggregators. Pinto and Smith 
describe the challenge in the US context. As they state, 
Handy, Uber, and several other gig companies have mounted a 
multijurisdictional policy campaign to rewrite the rules of 
worker classification to carve themselves out of  labor standards 
and to codify misclassification. At the federal and state levels, 
they are pushing both legislative and administrative changes 
that designate all workers who find work via so-called 
‘marketplace platforms’ as independent contractors who are 
not covered by labor and employment protections.41
The issue of  disguised employment is salient in jurisdictions where labour 
protection is relatively strong. In countries where the informal sector dominates, 
however, the issue of  regulation regarding self-employment is also salient. In 
Indonesia, drivers have been able to organise successfully because they were 
able to win protection under Indonesia’s laws covering self-employed workers 
who form cooperatives.42 In South Africa and India, however, interviewees who 
were previously self-employed as private car hire service providers, and were 
therefore already independent contractors, lost autonomy and status once they 
no longer had access to their own independent client base.43 
39 N van Doorn, ‘Late for a Job in the Gig Economy? Handy will dock your pay’, Quartz, 
3 October 2018, https://qz.com/work/1411833/handy-charges-fees-to-its-workers-
for-being-late-or-canceling-jobs.
40 Isaac.
41 M Pinto, R Smith, and I Tung, Rights at Risk: Gig companies’ campaign to upend employment 
as we know it, National Employment Law Project, 25 March 2019, https://s27147.
pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Rights-at-Risk-4-2-19.pdf.
42 Interview, Indonesian drivers in London, January 2020.




Platforms also further externalise costs onto precarious workers. Thus, even 
when platforms like SweepSouth guarantee workers a minimum wage, such 
platforms simultaneously exploit a business model that places responsibility for 
all search, transit, and other costs onto workers. There are significant hidden 
costs for SweepSouth workers. Those interviewed reported they spend around 
ZAR 50 on transport per booking, and upwards of  ZAR 35 on data and 
airtime per week. These hidden costs often amount to as much as ZAR 350-
400 (approx. USD 20) per week.44 High transport costs also reflect the spatial 
segregation of  Cape Town, with clients and workers typically living in different 
parts of  the city. While platforms like SweepSouth are easily able to collect the 
data on each worker to adjust for such costs, not only do they generally avoid 
doing so, but they may even be using algorithms to experiment with workers and 
determine how far they are willing to go to obtain a gig. Virtually every Uber 
driver I interviewed, in every city, reported that typically the first gig they would 
be offered when they logged on for a shift would be far from their starting 
point. Researchers have speculated that this is an intentional experiment to see 
how far drivers could be pushed to take on the costs they would incur to reach 
their first gig.45
Correcting for Techno-optimism
Human rights advocates have now amply documented ways in which social 
media platforms have been directly responsible not only for disseminating but 
pushing content that inflamed sectarian tensions in several countries.46 The 
firm Cambridge Analytica has purchased and sold data to political actors who 
have used it to exacerbate social tensions and manipulate voter behaviour in in 
several countries.47 As trade in data is not regulated, it is critical that we ask who 
else can purchase this data. Low-wage workers, and particularly those who are 
highly isolated such as migrant workers, have been identified as a population 
44 Per Hunt et al., the Sectoral Determination of  Minimum Wages for Domestic Workers 
(December 2018) stipulates that domestic workers in ‘bigger metropolitan areas’ 
working more than 27 hours per week are entitled to a minimum hourly wage of  ZAR 
13.69, while those working fewer than 27 hours are entitled to ZAR 16.03 per hour. 
For a 35-hour workweek, a domestic worker would earn approximately ZAR 479.
45 Interview with Michelle Miller, Director of  Coworker.org, 4 February 2020, 
Washington, D.C.
46 S Kelly et al., Freedom in the World 2017: Manipulating Social Media to Undermine Democracy, 
Freedom House, New York, November 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/
default/files/2020-02/FOTN_2017_Final_compressed.pdf; see also D Swislow, ‘The 
Distributed Denial of  Democracy’, Medium, 9 November 2016, https://medium.
com/@dswis/the-distributed-denial-of-democracy-23ce8a3ad3d8.
47 Kelly et al.
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that may be highly susceptible to online manipulation by violent extremists.48 
Are platforms designed to forestall such possibilities?
Development practitioners who were originally optimistic about the promise 
of  technology now realise that they failed to see the consequences of  enabling 
a business model premised on luring people into risky situations and extreme 
behaviours. Internet governance advocates have exposed a predatory business 
model whereby platform companies seek to monopolise markets, often 
knowingly breaking local laws.49 Platform firms engage in predatory behaviour 
not because of  the need to compete for consumers, but to compete for access 
to data, as their business model relies on their ability to hoard and monetise data. 
The promise of  technology to overcome labour market asymmetries has not 
been realised. Platform companies have been allowed to concentrate information 
and control over data. Information asymmetries may actually be exacerbated in 
the digital economy, as data extraction and algorithmic management enable new 
forms of  control over workers.
As the Tandem team notes, platforms need not be inherently exploitative, but 
it is critical that measures to provide transparency and enable worker agency be 
built into their design. In its early stages and prior to its acquisition, QuikrJobs’ 
predecessor, Babajob, was intended to improve opportunities for informal 
workers. This meant that certain design features were built into the platform 
to provide prospective workers with information about prevailing wages 
and conditions of  work, which enabled them to negotiate with employers. 
In addition, as Babajob’s funder USAID enforces an ‘open data’ policy, the 
company was unable to monopolise or monetise data extracted from its users. 
QuikrJobs continues to collect market and personal data, but no longer makes 
this information available to workers.
Can we build a better mousetrap? One example of  a platform intentionally 
designed to support worker agency and rights, Contratados, was noted above. 
A number of  ‘ethical’ alternatives to platforms for domestic work, ride-hailing, 
and the like have been launched recently, such as Well-Paid Maids (cleaning), 
Bzzt (transportation), and Fairbnb (short term rentals). These companies have 
embraced formal employment relationships with their workers, and, as Riggs and 
Batstone noted, have rejected the data-extractive business model of  their peers. 
Instead, these companies ‘use the value generated from their technologies not 
to expand the workforce to a vast peer-to-peer network, but to make drivers and 
48 Institute for Policy Analysis of  Conflict (IPAC), The Radicalisation of  Indonesian Women 





mechanics more efficient and to educate, train and retain them as employees.’50 
A movement to organise platform workers into cooperatives, incubated at the 
New School in New York, is also providing a vitally useful alternative to the 
data-extractive business model described.51 While such models provide helpful 
alternatives to workers, it will be difficult for any of  them to reach scale in a 
market where the imperative is toward data monopolisation.
A new set of  organisations that are focused on organising gig workers, such as 
Gig Workers Rising (US) and Worker Info Exchange (UK), are beginning to 
explore issues of  data privacy and data sovereignty. But they have yet to reach 
consensus on an alternative, worker-centred data ownership model. Some have 
pushed for the need for governments and municipalities to gather data from 
platform companies and create public data trusts; others have argued for worker 
ownership of  worker data.52
Kellogg, Valentin and Christin document examples of  ‘reverse surveillance’, or 
‘sousveillance’, as another strategy that supports collective action. This tactic 
requires pre-existing networks of  workers capable of  recording and uploading 
information about what is occurring in their work to make managers accountable 
via documentary evidence that, when shared, exposes patterns of  misconduct. 
As they note, employers have already pushed back against such tactics, for 
example by forbidding employees from utilising personal smartphones in 
workplaces.53
We will need more research and a solid evidence base beyond the existing case 
studies to enable effective and worker-centred alternatives. Further studies 
should create evidence that enables labour advocates to better understand how 
algorithms may be working to modify behaviour among such workers, and 
analyse the rights implications of  behavioural nudges, coercive ratings systems, 
and unpaid data labour with respect to existing definitions of  force, fraud, and 
coercion, and to labour arbitrage. 
50 W Riggs and D Batstone, ‘Balancing Profits and Human Dignity in the Gig Economy’, 
The Hill, 31 December 2019, https://thehill.com/opinion/finance/476344-balancing- 
profits-and-human-dignity-in-the-gig-economy.
51 New School, ‘The New School Announces the Launch of  the Institute for the 
Cooperative Digital Economy’, Press Release, 21 May 2019, https://www.newschool.
edu/pressroom/pressreleases/2019/ICDElaunch.htm; see also T Scholz, ‘Platform 
Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy’, Medium, 5 December 2014, https://medium.
com/@trebors/platform-cooperativism-vs-the-sharing-economy-2ea737f1b5ad.
52 T Scholz, Uberworked and Underpaid: How workers are disrupting the digital economy, Polity, 
Cambridge, 2016.
53 K C Kellogg, M A Valentine and A Christin, ‘Algorithms at Work: The new contested 
terrain of  control’, Academy of  Management Annals, vol. 14, no. 1, 2020, pp. 366-410, 
https://doi.org/10.5465/annals.2018.0174.
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Creating an enabling environment that supports collective action will also 
require new approaches for a digital economy. Researchers and advocates will 
need to analyse the relevance of  existing frameworks for labour law protection, 
and in particular the applications of  frameworks for organising and bargaining 
collectively. These frameworks have never adequately covered non-standard 
work, and with the further fragmentation of  work in the platform economy, 
new protections for these rights will be essential. As Alarcon and Gray note, 
‘traditional organizing models of  collective disruption through strikes and work 
slowdowns will have to be rethought. The platform economy generates a labour 
market of  peers and independent workers distributed around the globe.’54 This 
means there is no single professional identity, no physical space, and no single 
regulatory framework to serve as an organising principle. 
Platforms themselves have in some cases sought to replicate and create a virtual 
water cooler for gig workers, but with limited success. Mawii and Aneja of  
Tandem found that although SweepSouth management created a WhatsApp 
group for workers, most reported that they were inactive in the group. They 
felt that the presence of  a manager in each group prevented them from freely 
speaking to each other. However, on their own, workers do use WhatsApp to 
connect with one another.55 Domestic workers and Uber drivers I interviewed 
had set up their own groups to communicate, share information, and on 
occasion, organise solidarity actions. This organic, spontaneous organising 
needs better legal and institutional protection.
Conclusion
Under surveillance capitalism, workers are faced with new forms of  coercion 
and control. As these jobseekers look for information about possible jobs, and 
particularly in light of  the current economic crisis and the major dislocations 
it has caused in labour markets worldwide, it is likely that work itself  will be 
further fragmented and an increasing number of  platforms will emerge to 
replace traditional labour brokers. More and better research is needed to 
understand how digital platforms affect workers’ rights and agency. Yet given 
what we already know, it is also important to act now on several fronts. We 
must address the problem of  worker data ownership and control and promote 
more democratic forms of  data governance. We need to reconceptualise the 
employment relationship and create new ways to classify non-standard workers 
to ensure platform companies can be held accountable for worker exploitation. 
Finally, we need to consider further investment in interventions that directly 
enhance workers’ ability to connect with one another and act collectively.
54 Alarcon and Gray, p. 21.
55 Interview, Cape Town, November 2018.
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To date, well-intended donors have failed to understand the human rights 
implications of  their investments in platforms for labour markets, which 
may have expanded the means for coercing and controlling workers. As in 
the traditional economy, those workers who are in precarious or exploitative 
conditions, such as migrants and highly isolated workers, are also most 
vulnerable to digital exploitation. Putting workers at the centre of  design of  
such interventions, as subjects rather than objects, is critical. As gig workers 
begin to organise, it should become more possible to find credible worker 
representatives to inform or even participate in governance of  new initiatives, as 
is happening in the platform cooperative space. Correcting the practices of  the 
market leaders, however, and ensuring they do not usurp space for promising 
alternatives will require a substantial change in regulatory environments around 
the world. While the European Union has taken the first steps toward better 
regulation of  the gig economy, the governance challenge remains immense.
More work is needed to determine what advocates, donors, policymakers, and 
other stakeholders might do to support organising and collective action for 
this growing segment of  the global workforce. In the surveillance economy, 
protecting workers requires redefining rights at work, to take into account new 
critical questions of  accountability and autonomy. The platform economy is 
recommodifying labour. We need to democratise it.
Bama Athreya, Ph.D. is a Fellow at the Open Society Foundations and at Just 
Jobs Network. Her Open Society Fellowship is focused on worker agency in 
the digital economy. Most recently she worked for USAID where she assisted 
field missions around the world to develop programming to address labour 
rights, counter-trafficking, and promote women’s economic inclusion. She has 
developed and led multi-country projects and written and spoken extensively 
on the rights of  working women, on forced and child labour, and on ethical 
business practices. Email: athreyaosf@gmail.com
